GC42YM4 Couch's Reserve, Within A Stone's Throw (Traditional Cache) in Virginia, United States created by goingtopot

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goingtopot: Run its course.

GC42YM4 ▼

A cache by goingtopot Message this owner

Hidden : 12/30/2012

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Size: Size: micro (micro)

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On May 1, 1863, Hooker placed Couch's II Corps in reserve in this area of the Wilderness, where it would be soon joined by Sickles's III Corps.

The first shots of the Battle of Chancellorsville were fired at 11:20 a.m. as the armies collided. McLaws's initial attack pushed back Sykes's Division, but the Union general organized a counterattack that recovered the lost ground.

By 2 p.m., Hooker had ordered Hancock's division of the II Corps to advance and help repulse the Confederate attack. Meade's other two divisions made good progress on the River Road and were approaching their objective, Banks's Ford.

Getting out of the Wilderness was the essence of Hooker's needs. Despite being in a potentially favorable situation, Hooker halted his brief offensive. His actions may have demonstrated his lack of confidence in handling the complex actions of such a large organization for the first time.

Hooker had also decided before beginning the campaign that he would (based on the results of Union offensives at the first battle of Fredericksburg) fight the battle defensively, forcing Lee, with his smaller army, to attack Hooker's larger one.

Hooker knew Lee could not sustain such a defeat and keep an effective army in the field, so he ordered his men to withdraw back into the Wilderness and take a defensive position around Chancellorsville, daring Lee to attack him.

When he abandoned the chance to reach the clearing, Hooker at once passed the initiative, with all of its advantages, to Lee.

Hooker's communications informed Maj. Gen. Darius N. Couch: The major general commanding trusts that a suspension in the attack today will embolden the enemy to attack him."

The retrograde movement had prepared Couch for something of the kind.

To hear from Hooker's own lips that the advantages gained by the rearward marches of his lieutenants were to culminate in fighting a defensive battle in that nest of thickets, was too much.

Couch held the belief that his commanding general was a whipped man.

Hooker's other subordinates were surprised and outraged by the change in plans. They saw that the position they were fighting for near the Zoan Church was relatively high ground and offered an opportunity for the infantry and artillery to deploy outside the constraints of the Wilderness. Meade exclaimed, "My God, if we can't hold the top of the hill, we certainly can't hold the bottom of it!"

In hindsight, Hooker's concern was based on the ground being little more than a clearing in the Wilderness, to which access was available by only two narrow roads. The Confederate response had swiftly concentrated the aggressive Stonewall Jackson's Corps against his advancing columns such that the Federal army was outnumbered in that area, about 48,000 to 30,000, and would have difficulty maneuvering into effective lines of battle. Meade's two divisions on the River Road were too far separated to support Slocum and Sykes, and reinforcements from the rest of the II Corps and the III Corps would be too slow in arriving.

Lee would make superb use of the opportunity. As the Union troops dug in around Chancellorsville that night, creating log breastworks, Lee and Stonewall Jackson met at the intersection of the Plank Road and the Furnace Road to plan their next move. Jackson believed that Hooker would retreat across the Rappahannock, but Lee assumed that the Union general had invested too much in the campaign to withdraw so precipitously. If the Federal troops were still in position on May 2, Lee would attack them.

As they discussed their options, cavalry commander J.E.B. Stuart arrived with an intelligence report from his subordinate, Brig. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee. Although Hooker's left flank was firmly anchored by Meade's V Corps on the Rappahannock, and his center was strongly fortified, Meade's right flank was "in the air"." Lee directed Jackson to make the flanking march, a maneuver similar to the one that had been so successful prior to the Second Battle of Bull Run (Second Manassas).

Lee asked Jackson how many men he would take on the flanking march and Jackson replied, "with my whole command."

Excerpts from Wiki Civil War content

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