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No conventional bombing campaign in the history of warfare had ever amasses so much airpower, bomb tonnage and sorties than the Vietnam War. Even in the days of WWII when many hundreds of bombers would take off from England to strike German targets, their bomb loads paled in comparison to the Vietnam War. In all of WWII, 2.7 million tons of bombs were delivered in 1,440,000 bomber sorties, from 1942-1945, roughly 3 years. Nobody would dispute WWII was an intense bombing campaign, but technology allowed the bombers and their bomb loads to become enormous. From 4,000 to 10,000 lb bomb loads in WWII, to ~60,000-lb bomb loads on the B-52D in 1966. Even considering the length of the Vietnam War, the sortie count was much less, just over 124,532 bomber sorties by B-52s alone. Estimates of over 7 million tons of bombs was expended over Southeast Asia (North and South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos) in the 1965-1973 timeframe.
With this in mind, Operations Linebacker I and II set the stage for one of the fiercest bombing campaigns in history. Since American leaders early in the war decided not to achieve air superiority and destroy military targets in Vietnam, the North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong had more than sufficient time to become well-reinforced and supplied by Soviet and Chinese arms, building very strong, integrated defenses. Enter Operation Linebacker, an air interdiction campaign against fuel stocks, airfields, power plants, and radio stations which disrupted the flow of supplies and reinforcements to enemy units. There were four objectives for the campaign: to isolate North Vietnam from its sources of supply by destroying railroad bridges and rolling stock in and around Hanoi and north-eastwards toward the Chinese frontier; the targeting of primary storage areas and marshalling yards; to destroy storage and transshipment points and to eliminate (or at least damage) the North's air defense system. Started on 9 May 1972, Linebacker was intended to pressure the North Vietnamese to the peace talks table. With more than 200 BUFFs in Southeast Asia, 99-105 sorties daily were average during Linebacker. Even with intense bombing the offensive was rather limited and was limited in its effect; it was ended on 23 October 1972. Hanoi returned to the talks, and began to discuss a cease-fire.
The uneasy agreement by the North had gradually broken down throughout November and early December 1972 and the North ceased talks by December 16th. A more damaging campaign was needed, and it needed to strike the North where it had the most effect: military targets. Plans were authorized to strike military targets in both Hanoi and Haiphong. The target list was carefully built to minimize collateral damage and killing innocent civilians, as well as protect American prisoners of war located in Hanoi. On 18 December 1972, no less than 129 B-52s took off from both Andersen and U-Tapao, bound for Hanoi. This was the largest bomber force assembled since World War II, and it was day 1 of what was planned to be a 3-day offensive called Linebacker II. The bombers were formed into “Cells” of 3 BUFFs, separated by 500 feet in altitude and one mile in horizontal distance. After the post-target turn, the skies filled with 200 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), up to 40 simultaneously. Three BUFFs were lost to enemy action on day 1. Day 2 had 93 BUFFs, and despite SAM ferocity, none were shot down. Day three was different.
Previously, SAC headquarters had ordered aircraft commanders not to take evasive action in the face of threats from either SAMs or MiGs (Soviet-designed fighters) during the long run in from the initial point (where the crew begins their bomb run) to bombs away. The speed and direction of the turn after the bomb drop was designed to get the bombers out of SAM range as soon as possible. The tactics were needed primarily because SAC wanted to preserve electronic countermeasures integrity of the three-ship formations while making sure that only military targets were hit. The SAC-directed tactics and route made the B-52 force very predictable. The Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army knew when and where the BUFFs would show up and simply planned for their arrival. Tactics needed to change if aircrew were to survive the barrage.
On day 3, 90 BUFFs made their bomb runs, but a whopping six were shot down. Mostly the newer Gs, but they had not been modified with improved electronic countermeasures equipment (ECM); even so, a modified G was still downed by the intense aerial defense. Up till now, the “loss rate” was acceptable, but a loss rate of seven percent was not. SAC’s commander drove new tactics—hit the enemy SAM and antiaircraft sites as hard as you can. For such a small country, they had amassed a significant air defense system, but were shooting SAMs faster than they could be replenished.
More tactics changes were authorized (altitude changes, multiple approach paths, and the selection of new targets outside the HanoiHaiphong area) but of 30 BUFFs launched from U-Tapao, two didn’t come home on Day 4 (Christmas Eve) as they struck an airfield supporting MiGs. Days 5-7 also launched 30 BUFFs, and none were lost, due to the unpredictable new tactics. No sorties were launched on Christmas Day, but the enemy restocked their SAMs, thinking America got tired of sending bombers. Day 8 was 26 December; no less than 120 BUFFs were sent hard and heavy against both Haiphong and Hanoi, leveraging their new tactics to great advantage. Even with the new tactics and effective allied aircraft ECM and radar-confusing “chaff” support, two more BUFFs were shot down in the fierce SAM barrage.
A full sixty BUFFs were launched on days 9-11, but even with fewer aircraft, they were fast running out of targets, and due to the mass salvo firing of SAMs earlier in Linebacker II, the enemy was fast running out of missiles to shoot. On day 9, 2 BUFFs were lost; one shot down over Vietnam, the other crippled and crashing enroute back to Thailand. By day 11, the North Vietnamese only fired 23 SAMs; their stocks depleted, MiGs grounded, and their radars out of commission. Only when they had been pounded to a pulp did North Vietnam return to the negotiating tables. On 29 December 1972, Operation Linebacker II was over.
In Linebacker II, SAC’s B-52s had completed 729 sorties out of a total of 741 planned sorties and dropped 15,000 tons of bombs. North Vietnamese forces had fired about 1,240 SAMs. The Air Force lost 15 B-52 bombers, which amounted to a loss rate of less than two percent. Of 92 B-52 crew members involved in the losses, 26 were recovered, 25 came up missing in action, 33 became prisoners of war, and eight were either killed in action or later died of wounds. The campaign had come with a cost, but it was over. The Paris Peace Accords were signed in January 1973. By that April, all 591 of America’s known POWs were released. On 15 August 1973, with the Paris agreements seemingly being honored by Hanoi, the B-52s flew their last combat mission, and Operation Arc Light was terminated. For the Americans, the Vietnam War was finally over. While the losses sustained over Vietnam may have been avoidable, the Linebacker II campaign should have been launched in 1965 before the North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong had the opportunity to dig in their impressive defenses.
To find this cache, calculate the coordinates from the information in this listing.
N 48° 18.ABC W 101° 19.DEF
A= Approximate B-52D bomb load in 1966, NX,XXX lbs, A=(N+3)
B= Upper range of average sorties daily during Linebacker, NXX sorties daily, B=(Nx1)
C= Maximum simultaneous SAM firings on 18 December 1972, NN SAMs, C=(NN/8)
D= Number of BUFFs lost on Linebacker II days 5-7, N aircraft, D=(N)
E= Day in December 1972 Operation Linebacker II was over, XN December, E=(N-3)
F= Number B-52 sorties completed during Linebacker II, XXN sorties, F=(N/1)
https://www.historynet.com/the-11-day-war.htm
Rigole, 2002. The strategic bombing campaign against Germany during World War II. https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4267&context=gradschool_theses
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Linebacker_II
https://media.defense.gov/2017/Mar/28/2001722969/-1/-1/0/04-ILL_HIST_CH08-CH10_(PAGES149-200).PDF
https://media.defense.gov/2010/Sep/24/2001330077/-1/-1/0/Air%20War%20Over%20South%20Vietnam%20opt.pdf
https://www.airforcemag.com/article/1197linebacker/
https://wikieducator.org/images/8/8b/VIETNAM_WAR_BACKGROUND.pdf
https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AUPress/Books/B_0091_MEILINGER_AIRPOWER_MYTHS_FACTS.PDF
https://www.airforcemag.com/article/0109arc/