Virtual Reward - 2017/2018
This Virtual Cache is part of a limited release of Virtuals created between August 24, 2017 and August 24, 2018. Only 4,000 cache owners were given the opportunity to hide a Virtual Cache. Learn more about Virtual Rewards on the Geocaching Blog.
Cache Logging Requirements: To log this cache, take a picture of you and/or your GPSr in front of the marker(your face does not have to be in picture). Firstly I am very grateful for being chosen to submit such a rare cache I've just been too busy to give it the time it deserves. I would like to thank Pat Vaughn a.k.a. woodwalker for taking the initiative and lead with the listing . He helped decide on a worthy location, and provided the writing, pictures and coordinates. Only Two Got Out Alive On August 9, 1965, the Titan II Launch Complex 373-4, located near the town of Searcy, Arkansas, was undergoing a modification program called Project YARD FENCE. Project YARD FENCE was part of a modification program designed to facilitate maintenance and increase reliability, and improve hardness against a nearby nuclear blast. Per plan, the missile remained in the launch duct fully loaded with propellant, but with the reentry vehicle removed. There were over 50 local workmen on site. Work was in progress simultaneously throughout the silo and on the surface of the site. Hydraulic System 2, the system that operated the launch duct work platforms and silo blast valves was being flushed. A hydraulic reservoir and pump were located on the surface with pressure and return lines fed through a reopened 8-inch-diameter construction access port in the silo closure door apron. The silo closure door was closed. The silo equipment area hardening modifications required oxy-acetylene cutting torches and electric arc welding equipment on Levels 2,3,5,6, and 7 of the silo equipment area. Work within the launch duct included painting the access hatches for the silo closure T-lock wells on Level 1 and installation of steel covers on acoustic modules on and just above Level 7. At 1309 laborer Gary Lay was standing with 12 coworkers near the emergency escape ladder that connected silo equipment area Level 2 to Level 3. Lay felt a rush of warm air on his back and turned to see flames directly behind him near the water chiller shock isolation platform. The lights went out, the emergency lighting system came on, and the group rushed for the escape ladder. Lay decided to try to go through the fire area and out to the cableway. Hurbert Sanders, a painter working in the launch duct on Level 1, smelled smoke and left the launch duct. Just as the silo lights went out, he found the access ladder to silo equipment area Level 2 and descended. There he met Lay, and they both ran down the the launch control center with smoke billowing behind them. In the launch control center, the first indication of a problem came with the illumination of the FIRE DIESEL AREA indicator on the Launch Control Complex Facilities Console in the launch control center. As the klaxons sounded throughout the complex, Capt David Yount began the silo fire emergency checklist and ordered the evacuation of the silo area. Personnel on the surface notices smoke coming out of the hose access area. As the surface warning control lights and sirens activated, all power was lost in the complex. At 1311 Lay and Saunders, the only two survivors from within the silo equipment and launch duct areas, entered the launch control center. Lay had numerous burns on his hands and face, while Saunders was suffering smoke inhalation. Yount called the wing command post requesting a Missile Potential Hazard Team (MPHT) be formed. At 1320 the base hospital was alerted and ambulances were requested to be send the the launch complex. At 1316 MSgt Ronald Wallace BMAT and A1C Donald Hastings, MFT, donned air packs and proceeded to Level 2 of the silo. They reported extreme heat and smoke but did not see flames and returned to the launch control center. At 1407, Col Charles Sullivan, the 308th SMW commander, requested a physical count of personnel on the site and was told that 53 workers were missing. Firefighters and equipment were dispatched from the main base at 1411 by helicopter followed by medical vehicles. From 1440 to 1630 additional support equipment was dispatched. At 1800 the missile combat crew attempted to open the silo closure door to permit ventilation of the launch duct, but the door failed to open. At 1915 no fire was visible in the silo equipment area on Level 2, but smoke and fumes were still too dense to conduct further rescue operations. One hour later, a rescue team was able to reach Level 5. Finding no survivors and with their air supplies running out, they returned for air replenishment and proceeded to Level 8 at 2030. At 2240 SAC Disaster Control Center reported 53 fatalities, with two hospitalized survivors. The last casualty was removed from the silo at 0530 on August 10th 1965. The 53 fatalities were distributed throughout the silo. Twelve were on Level 2, 24 on Level 3, 8 on Level 4, 1 on Level 5, and 4 each on Levels 6 and 7. The final report attributed the primary cause of the accident to be "that a welding (contract employed civilian) caused a flexible high pressure line containing flammable hydraulic fluid to rupture by accidentally striking it with a welding rod". Combined with a lighting system that was not strong enough to penetrate the thick smoke from the fire and an escape system that was never meant to accommodate 53 people in an emergency. Each of the workers had been issued a face mask for use if a rocket propellant spill occurred, but these masks offered no protection from the fumes of a fire.