Thirtymile Memorial Traditional Cache

The stillness of this place is eerie amidst the lingering smoke. The Chewuch River makes no sound as it glides by. Yet, there was violence here unimaginable to anyone who didn't witness the conflagration. Four people died here.

The charred surfaces of rocks are now calico cat-like from flaking, and boulders have been fractured by the heat. The conifers' small branches are frozen in time, needles intact, as they twisted away from the blast of the fire, and their trunks can't be blacker. Abandoned fire shelters lie scattered about on the ground and another glistens from the river bottom. The burned-out shell of a pickup truck sits on the road with windshield glass drooping over the dashboard and rivers of molten aluminum flowing away. This is a place that will long be remembered by the survivors and families of the deceased.

~Prologue to the  Thirtymile Fire  Investigative Report~

¤ Chewuch River Canyon, about 30 miles north of Winthrop, Washington ¤

The area was enduring a lengthy drought and the moisture levels in large fuels were very low. The Energy Release Component, a measure of potential fire intensity, was near historic high levels for this time of year. Temperatures on July 10th reached nearly 100°F, and the humidity was very low. Although there was no dramatic shift in weather that would have created high winds, such as a dry cold front, up-canyon breezes were present to aggravate burning conditions. Fire conditions were potentially extreme.

Monday
July 9, 2001

9:26 PM
Bird Dog 8 (a Canadian Lead Plane), returning to Canada after supporting the Libby South Fire (burning about 20 miles south of Winthrop, Washington), reported seeing a fire near the road along the Chewuch River about 30 miles north of Winthrop.

10:00 PM
A three-person initial attack crew and Engine #704 were dispatched.

11:45 PM
Engine #704 arrived at the fire.  At about midnight when the Okanogan Dispatch asked the Incident Commander (IC) if the fire could be let go until the morning, he responded that the fire needed "to be taken care of tonight because if it hits that slope it is going to the ridge top."

Shortly after midnight The Northwest Regulars #6 (NWR #6) Fire Crew was called up.  NWR#6 was made up of 21 individuals from two different Ranger Districts located in central Washington State.  Tom Craven, Karen FitzPatrick, Jessica Johnson, Devin Weaver were among these individuals.   They were informed they were being assigned to support the Libby South Fire.  The majority of the crew had as little as one or two hours of sleep before being called.

July 10, 2001

7:00 AM
The crew arrived at the Twisp Ranger Station to await their briefing. The NWR #6 crew was informed that they would not be going to the Libby South Fire. Rather, they would be assigned to do mop up on the smaller Thirtymile Fire. Many of the rookie crewmembers were disappointed.

9:04 AM
The group arrived at the fire site.

11:00 AM
After the NWR #6 crew completed the safety briefings, the pumps were set up and the crew crossed a log to the east side of the river and began to apply water to the fire and dig line.

2:00 PM
The NWR #6 crewmembers were working on the east side of the river.  A little later it was decided to pull the NWR #6 crew back across the river to the road. The fire had been burning through the hoses in several places and spotting over their containment line.   They "had lost the fire."

3:00 PM.
The NWR #6 crew was pulled back to the lunch site "safety zone" on the west side of the river. There they  ate lunch, rested, watered, and sharpened their tools as they watched the fire continue to grow.

3:30 PM
Crew leaders discuss their concern that the initial attack had not contained the fire.  They receive a call from Engine #701 Supervisor asking for help with a spot on the east side of the road. They evaluated the situation and decided to bring a squad up to support the Engine.   NWR #6 Squad 1 (Tom Craven's squad) was dropped off at Engine #701.  A few minutes later Thom Taylor, the Squad 2 Boss, was told to take his squad up to support the Engines.

4:34 PM
Squad 3 was called to support Engine #704. Within 2 minutes of arriving at the location of Engine #704 the crew was ordered back in the van.  The fire was actively spotting and had moved right up to the east side of the road. The crew quickly drove back down the road to their
lunch site "safety zone." Crewmembers from the NWR #6 Squad 3 had to shield their faces from the intense heat as they drove past the fire.

As Squad 3 retreated, they radioed to get the people out of the area. NWR #6 Squads 1 and 2 were about ¼ mile further up the road from where Engine #704 had been working.

The crewmembers from Squads 1 and 2 dropped their gear and nine of them jumped into the van. The other four began running down the road.  As the van was driven down the road it encountered a "wall of flames".  The van driver quickly turned the van around, picked up the other crewmembers and the crew gear, and drove about a mile up the canyon.
                                                                              
While retreating north the crew leader evaluated three possible sites then selected the fourth site as the place were they could safely watch the fire pass them by.  It was characterized by extensive rock scree above and west of the road. The Chewuch River and a sand bar were just east of the road.  The NWR #6 crew unloaded and began to congregate on and above the road as they watched the fire. The van was turned around and parked on the side of the road next to the river.

5:00 PM
Two civilians arrived at the entrapment site after having driven up the road earlier in the afternoon. The couple had been resting at the Thirtymile Campground and had become worried about the fire. No spare shelters(fire shelters) or personal protective equipment were made available to the civilians.

5:24 PM
The behavior of the fire changed dramatically. In spite of the lack of forest vegetation and brush in the immediate vicinity of the crew, the immensity of the fire overwhelmed the area and the crew. The abruptness of this change appears to have caught the crew by surprise. They were not in a heightened state of readiness. Shelter deployment was no longer optional but essential if any were to survive.
Crewmembers reported the fire was "coming very fast, roaring" and was preceded by ash and a "fire snowstorm."   The IC directed the crewmembers to "get your shelters out and use against the ash" in order to protect them from falling embers.  Very quickly thereafter he shouted to the crewmembers "Deploy! Deploy!"  Some did not hear him due to the noise of the fire which sounded like a "freight train."  8 fireshelters were deployed on the road, one of which held one firefighter and the two civilians.  6 shelters were deployed in the scree field above the road.  Within minutes two of the firefightes exited their shelters in the scree field.  One ran down and jumped into the river.  The other ran down and jumped into the van.

Approximately 5:45
When safe to emerge from the fire shelters, the IC ordered everyone into the river.  After numerous head counts the reality set in, the 4 remaining crew members who had deployed in the scree field were not responding.

After 30 minutes the scree field was still to hot to check on the remaining firefighters who had deployed there.

The van remained virtually undamaged, aside from a slightly melted license plate frame.

It was later determined that the fire had started as the result of an abandoned picnic cooking fire.

¤ The Investigative Report from which the above excerpts were taken revealed that the deaths could have been avoided.  Numerous errors were made throughout the incident, which culminated in the tragic loss of 4 young firefighters. ¤