Not at posted coordinates! Be sure to check the logbook for the bonus codes!
In the last installment in the series, we examined ground alert. What if 15-minute alert time was not enough? In the late 1950s, the threat of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) was growing, thanks to the October 1957 launch of the Soviet rocket and satellite called Sputnik. If the Soviets could put a satellite into space, what’s preventing them from putting a nuclear warhead on it? Missiles are far faster than bombers, even jet bombers, so a missile could be launched from Russia and strike a target in the United States in about a half hour. Given the time it would take to identify a rocket launch, trajectory, verify a strike was in progress and give national leaders decision making time, 15 minutes may not be enough. The next best thing would be to have the retaliatory force already airborne.
Enter airborne alert. General Thomas Power (Commander of Strategic Air Command (SAC) indicated “a certain percentage” of SAC was in the air as early as November 1957 (a month after ground alert began), but this wasn’t standard operating procedure just yet. Studying declassified SAC documents indicates this was likely a B-36 Peacemaker (with an equally enormous bomb load capacity as the BUFF), and in late 1957 SAC has almost 1700 bombers assigned. It may not have been much more than a wild experiment, but airborne alert had been born.
In 1958, the 42nd Bombardment Wing at Loring AFB, Maine had been selected to launch Operation Head Start I. The operation was a trial that kept several B-52Ds nuclear-loaded and airborne 24/7 from 15 September and 15 December 1958. The trial continued as Operation Head Start II as Fairchild AFB, Washington with five B-52Ds nuclear armed and airborne 24/7 from 2 March and 30 June 1959. An average airborne alert sortie would be a grueling 10,000 miles, two aerial refuelings and at least 24 hours and 30 minutes on duty.
The trials at Loring and Fairchild proved airborne alert was possible, feasible and would need fundamental changes within SAC to spread the load across many wings. SAC pitched the idea to the Secretary of Defense in early 1959 with a goal of a quarter of the 600 BUFFs on airborne alert around the clock. The powers-the-be dismissed such a large airborne force and compromised at 1/8th, a whopping 75 bombers on airborne alert, and authorized SAC to start to plan for it for one year. Imagine the resources required to keep 75 BUFFs nuclear armed and airborne 24/7/365: it doesn’t take a professional accountant to realize enormous crew, fuel, maintenance and support requirements that would be needed to sustain airborne alert for a year, much less accelerated wear and tear on the aircraft. Budgets then allowed about 10 bombers to be on airborne alert ($15-25 million); a total bill of $800 million (in 1959 dollars—over $7 billion today!!) is what it would cost for SAC to maintain 1/8th of the bomber force on airborne alert. Irrespective of aircraft kept on airborne alert, SAC wings were still required to keep bombers on ground alert as well!
To find this cache, calculate the coordinates from the information in this listing.
N 48° 19.ABC W 101° 15.DEF
A= October of what year did the Soviets launch Sputnik, October XXXN, A=(N-1)
B= Approx. quantity of SAC bombers assigned in late 1957, XXNX aircraft, B=(N/0)
C= Day in September 1958 Loring AFB began Operation Head Start I, XN September, C=(N/1)
D= Final day in June 1959 Fairchild AFB ended Operation Head Start II, XN June, D=(Nx1)
E= Average airborne alert sortie duration in whole hours, NX hours, E=(Nx2)
F= Cost of SAC’s airborne alert proposal to Secretary of Defense in early 1959, $XNX million, F=(N/9)
Dorr, R. & Peacock, L. (1995). Boeing’s Cold War Warrior: B-52 Stratofortress. London, UK; Osprey Aerospace.