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The B-52 is well-suited to sustained, heavy bombing operations. As we had explored over Vietnam (see Feelin’ BUFF 32: B-52s in Vietnam: Operation LINEBACKER, LINEBACKER II), the shock & awe campaign against strategic targets in a swift blow sent the enemy to the peace talks tables. Since we learned the hard way after Vietnam, when Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi Army invaded their neighbor, Kuwait, when strikes were authorized, B-52s went straight to work, doing what they do best: hit the enemy hard, fast and make them shake in fear.
The buildup of forces in the Persian Gulf was intended to be calculated and depict defensive preparation not a prelude to an all-out offensive against Iraqi targets. Thus, Operation Desert Shield began, from August 1990-16 January 1991. This period of time allowed American and coalition planners time to determine targets, build battle plans, and build up forces to be ready when attack orders were given. The B-52 was specifically noted to have a psychological objective in strategic bombing—literally to scare the wits out of Iraqi ground forces from the strength of the air campaign before the ground campaign began.
BUFFs began the buildup of forces in the Gulf almost immediately. On 12 August 1990, seven G-model aircraft from the 42nd Bomb Wing (BW) at Loring AFB, ME deployed fully armed with chaff, flare, gun ammo and bombs to Diego Garcia, British Indian Ocean Territory (1,000 miles from India, 7° south from the equator). Other wings soon added to the complement of BUFFs and aircrews on the tiny island: 2 BW/ Barksdale AFB, LA, 93 BW/Castle AFB, CA and 416 BW/Griffiss AFB, NY. The aircraft and crews on Diego Garcia were attached to the 4300th Bomb Wing (Provisional) (P), and by 16 August, a full 20 B-52Gs were armed and ready. Although up to 32 BUFFs deployed to the island, peak strength was 24 aircraft.
Another base closer to the target was soon added; Jeddah, Saudi Arabia at King Abdul Aziz International Airport became the 1708 BW (P). The site was surveyed in October 1990, but due to sensitivities, was not immediately used as a BUFF base until January. Six BUFFs from Diego Garcia arrived in January 1991, with another five from Wurtsmith AFB, MI’s 379 BW, three from 93 BW and two from the 42 BW. The jets that transferred from Diego Garcia were replaced from Andersen AFB, Guam. Theater commanders wanted an even bigger BUFF force, so two BW(P)s were added in Moron de la Frontera (Moron, 801 BW(P)), Spain and Royal Air Force Fairford, England (Fairford, 806 BW(P)). The Moron wing had 25 to 27 aircraft deployed, from five SAC wings. The Fairford wing was smaller, with four SAC wings providing 10 aircraft plus crews.
The B-52G force, although many having seen combat over Southeast Asia, was a far different, and improved airplane than it was during Vietnam. A complete upgrade in offensive, radar, defensive (electronic countermeasures—jamming) and conventional weapon employment systems was undertaken in the Gs. The H’s were still dedicated to the nuclear mission, so they were missing many of the conventional upgrades and not used in the Gulf War. Their nuclear-specialized crews had been cross-trained to use the G’s new suite of conventional weaponry, and all studied their targets, routes, flight plans and tactics just as they had in the “mole holes” while on nuclear alert.
When the United Nations 16 January deadline loomed near, there was no indication Hussein would back down, so 18 BUFFs on Diego Garcia (recall only the island was an active, authorized BW(P) at the start of the war) were fueled, readied and taxied for takeoff. Virtually the entire tent city worth of AF maintainers, support personnel and US Navy sailors of all kinds lined the taxiways for thousands of feet to give a proper send-off to the crews, coming to the position of attention and saluting each departing aircraft. Casualties as high as 30% were predicted in the mission planning, and nobody knew who might not be coming home. After all 18 aircraft lifted off into the night, 5 “air spares” returned to base. The same group of send-off personnel were still in place to watch the bombers land and recover. There were no casualties that first night, and the crews were treated like heroes.
The first 3 nights, some 36 aircraft sorties were sent in at extremely low-level to destroy strategic targets in Iraq. The crews were highly proficient at flying in just off the deck, making their target runs, and completing sorties. Six of the first night aircraft recovered at Jeddah as-planned, while seven mission aircraft returned to the island safely due to finely-honed low-level tactics, and other than battle damage, no BUFF was lost to enemy action through the entire campaign. That is not to say the aircraft were uncontested—far from it. Surface to air missiles (SAMs) and anti-aircraft artillery barrages almost the equal of that over Hanoi in Linebacker II met the BUFFs and coalition aircraft as they charged towards their targets. Some aircraft were so shot up, they were gushing fuel from wing tanks, engines flamed out, and one could see daylight thru the fuselage from the barrage. Jamming, fighter support and SAM-suppression aircraft joined the fight to protect the coalition as they fought for air superiority. Only one aircraft (59-2593) was lost; it suffered a fuel management problem on 3 February 1991, causing 5 engines to flame out. While 3 of the crew successfully ejected, 3 did not and the aircraft crashed into the sea about 12 miles from the island, with the loss of 3 crewmen.
The first few nights dealt Iraq a blow from which it would not recover. The campaign continued unabated from Diego Garcia, Jedda, Moron and Fairford until 28 February 1991. Unsurprisingly, the Jeddah BUFFs tallied the most sorties and bombs dropped in the campaign—as the closest to the targets, their missions were far shorter. An average 24 sorties a day, with maximum of 29 in one day. The BUFFs dropped 27,000 tons of bombs in total (30% of all coalition aircraft, and 40% of the Air Force total), but Jeddah Gs dropped more than 20% of all bombs dropped by all coalition aircraft. Of all 1,625 B-52G sorties, Jeddah BUFFs completed 841 alone. The Moron and Fairford as well as the Diego Garcia aircraft had far longer, and thus, fewer sorties to their credits. Moron flew 293 sorties, but logged almost 4,400 flying hours (more than Jeddah is more than twice the sorties). Fairford logged 62 sorties, and over 900 flying hours. Diego Garcia logged 459 sorties and over 6.500 flying hours. There were clear advantages to being closer to the fight.
On a closing note, the sound of BUFFs overhead made the Iraqi Army shake in their boots. The psychological effect of the bomber was clearly demonstrated in a Gulf War-era joke then popular: “What’s the quickest way to clear out an Iraqi bingo hall? Call out B-52!”
To find this cache, calculate the coordinates from the information in this listing.
N 48° 19.ABC W 101° 18.DEF
A= Number of B-52Gs on 12 August 1990 deployed from 42 BW fully armed to Diego Garcia, N, A=(N-1)
B= Day in August 1990 when 20 B-52Gs were armed and ready at 4300 BW (P), NX August, B=(N+0)
C= Designation of BW (P) at Royal Air Force Fairford, England, XXN BW (P), C=(Nx1)
D= Quantity of BUFFs that took off on the first night from Diego Garcia, XN B-52Gs, D=(N/8)
E= Serial number of only aircraft lost on 3 February 1991, 59-XNXX, E=(Nx1)
F= Total bomb tonnage dropped in the Gulf War by B-52Gs, NN,XXX tons, F=(NN/9)
Lake, J. (2004). B-52 Stratofortress Units in Operation Desert Storm. Osprey: University Park, IL.